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PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL 
Recent Developments in England and Wales 
This article analyses the contrasting reasoning and outcomes 
in two cases concerning proprietary estoppel that recently 
came before the highest court in England and Wales. It argues 
that a context-based dichotomy may emerge in the 
application of estoppel principles in order to reconcile the 
Law Lords’ opinions. The article highlights the difficulties in 
drawing distinctions between “domestic” and “commercial” 
cases. It then discusses general difficulties raised by the use of 
proprietary estoppel in the “domestic” context and 
specifically in connection with the enforcement of oral 
testamentary promises. With an eye to developments in the 
comparative law, the article concludes that a statutory scheme 
for the enforcement of such promises could remedy the 
difficulties outlined by removing many “domestic” cases from 
the realm of estoppel. 
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I. Introduction 
1 The very word “estoppel” is defensive. As such, proprietary 
estoppel was classically used to prevent landowners from 
unconscionably asserting their strict legal entitlement as against an 
improver of the land’s value.1 In the modern era, however, it has become 
a powerful “sword” for claimants who have detrimentally relied on 
representations given by property owners. The detrimental reliance, 
moreover, need not be in the form of improvements to the land. In 
Watts v Story, Slade LJ decided that it was not “possible, or even 
desirable, to attempt to define the nature and extent of the prejudice or 
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1 See, eg, Plimmer v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Wellington (1884) 
9 App Cas 699. 
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detriment which has to be established”.2 Indeed, as Lord Walker has 
pointed out, most English estoppel claims are now founded on the 
claimant’s “assistance” to the defendant.3 
2 The concept of an estoppel claim and the recognition of a wide 
range of detriment make the precise nature of the requisite 
representation a vital question, and it is one with which the Singaporean 
courts have struggled in recent years.4 The attributes of a qualifying 
representation have attracted particular controversy in England and 
Wales in cases where a claimant uses estoppel to enforce an alleged oral 
testamentary promise,5 thus circumventing the formality requirements 
relating to wills6 and the intestacy rules.7 
3 This article discusses two recent House of Lords decisions on 
proprietary estoppel, and ascertains the extent to which it is necessary to 
rely on their factual contexts in order to justify the differing conclusions 
of the Appellate Committee in each case. It then evaluates the utility of a 
context-based approach to property law and considers an alternative 
solution to the use of estoppel for the enforcement of testamentary 
promises. 
4 Part II of the article begins the analysis by outlining the facts 
and the results in the two cases. The first is Yeoman’s Row Management 
Ltd v Cobbe,8 an unsuccessful estoppel claim in a commercial scenario 
involving an anticipated contract that did not materialise. Thorner v 
Major,9 by contrast, was more of a domestic affair relating to a 
testamentary promise of sorts, where the promisee’s claim was allowed 
to succeed. 
5 Part III of the article asks whether context must be invoked to 
justify the differing conclusions in the two cases, or whether Thorner 
marks a departure from Yeoman’s Row notwithstanding the fact that the 
two cases were decided within a year of each other. Part IV explores 
some of the difficulties of using context as a distinguishing mechanism 
                                                                       
2 Watts v Story Transcript No 319 of 1983 (14 July 1983). 
3 Robert Walker, “Which Side ‘Ought to Win’? – Discretion and Certainty in 
Property Law” [2008] Sing JLS 229. 
4 See, eg, Fook Gee Finance Co Ltd v Lim Cho Chit [1998] 2 SLR 121; Keppel Tat Lee 
Bank Ltd v Teck Koon Investment [2000] 2 SLR 366; Hong Leong Singapore Finance 
Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR 292. 
5 See, eg, Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498; Wayling v Jones [1995] 2 FLR 1029; Gillett v 
Holt [2001] Ch 210; Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159. 
6 Wills Act 1837 (c 26) (UK). 
7 Administration of Estates Act 1925 (c 23) (UK) s 46. 
8 [2008] UKHL 55; [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
9 [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776. The case is also referred to as Thorner v 
Majors, due to a typographical error (see John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary 
Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and Family Law Quarterly 367 at 367 n 1). 
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in estoppel, and includes a comparison with the treatment of similar 
issues in the realm of the common intention constructive trust. Finally, 
Part V considers the question whether a statutory mechanism for the 
enforcement of testamentary promises, such as New Zealand’s Law 
Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, would be preferable given 
the difficulties inherent in using estoppel for that purpose. 
II. The cases 
6 This part provides a summary of the two cases that inspire most 
of the discussion in this article. The differing approaches of the 
members of the House of Lords will be used to assess whether a context-
based dichotomy is likely to emerge in the application of proprietary 
estoppel principles. Such a dichotomy may require any given case to be 
classified as either “domestic” or “commercial” at the outset of the 
analysis. 
A. The Yeoman’s Row case 
7 Mr Cobbe, a property developer, reached an oral agreement in 
principle with Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring to purchase and develop property. 
The property in question, a block of flats, was owned by a company 
effectively controlled by Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring. As part of the 
arrangement, Mr Cobbe was to obtain, at his own expense, planning 
permission for the demolition of the existing flats and the building of 
some houses on the site. Only when he did so would the property be 
sold to him for £12m. There was also a term whereby he would pay to 
the company half of any proceeds above £24m from the eventual sale of 
the houses. 
8 The agreement in principle did not cover all of the relevant 
terms, but the planning permission was successfully obtained in the 
interim as a result of considerable effort and expenditure on Mr Cobbe’s 
part. Although Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring had encouraged the expenditure 
and had led Mr Cobbe to believe that a formal contract would be 
forthcoming, she then refused to adhere to the original financial terms 
of the agreement. Relations between the parties soured and Mr Cobbe 
brought several claims, including one based on estoppel. His proprietary 
claims failed before the House of Lords.10 
                                                                       
10 A claim based on the Pallant v Morgan equity (see Kevin Gray & Susan Francis 
Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2009) at 
paras 7.3.42–7.3.43) was also rejected: [2008] UKHL 55 at [30]–[36]. 
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9 In rejecting Mr Cobbe’s estoppel claim, the House of Lords11 
reached the opposite conclusion to both Etherton J at first instance12 and 
the Court of Appeal.13 Lord Scott of Foscote could not find a point of 
fact or law whose denial could justify a claim to a specific proprietary 
interest, which he regarded as an essential element of an estoppel claim. 
Meanwhile, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe focused on Mr Cobbe’s lack 
of belief that Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring was legally obliged to transfer the 
property to him as a result of the arrangement. These similar but 
distinct approaches are explored in more detail in Part III. Both main 
speeches had the potential to undermine the abilities of estoppel  
in testamentary cases, and generally, such that Yeoman’s Row was 
branded a “jurisprudential milestone”.14 As we shall see, however, 
Thorner v Major suggests that Yeoman’s Row has had less of an impact 
than some had predicted.15 In the words of McFarlane and Robertson, 
“the apocalypse … has been averted”.16 
10 Mr Cobbe was awarded a quantum meruit on the basis of a 
questionable analysis of the relevant principles of unjust enrichment,17 
but that aspect of the decision is not addressed here. 
B. The Thorner case 
11 The late Peter Thorner was a Somerset farmer, a “man of few 
words” who tended to speak in indirect terms.18 David Thorner, the son 
of Peter’s cousin Jimmy, began to help at Peter’s farm after Peter’s first 
wife died. At one time, he was working 18-hour days, splitting his time 
between Peter and Jimmy’s farms. He was never paid for almost 30 years 
                                                                       
11 [2008] UKHL 55. 
12 [2005] EWHC 266 (Ch). 
13 [2006] EWCA Civ 1139. 
14 Terence Etherton, “Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: The Search for 
Clarity and Principle” [2009] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 104 at 116. 
15 The relationship between the two cases has generated an enormous amount of 
interest among academics and others. Aside from the material cited elsewhere in 
this article, see eg Stuart Bridge, “Proprietary estoppel: where are we now?” 
(Blundell Lecture, 29 June 2009); Timothy Morshead, “Proprietary estoppel: where 
are we now? Or, needlework for equity lawyers” (Blundell Lecture, 29 June 2009); 
Nick Piska, “Hopes, Expectations and Revocable Promises in Proprietary Estoppel” 
(2009) 72 MLR 998; Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, “The Stuffing of Minerva’s 
Owl? Taxonomy and Taxidermy in Equity” [2009] CLJ 537. 
16 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “Apocalypse Averted: Proprietary Estoppel 
in the House of Lords” (2009) 125 LQR 535 at 535. 
17 Joshua Getzler, “Quantum Meruit, Estoppel, and the Primacy of Contract” (2009) 
125 LQR 196. 
18 [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch); [2008] WTLR 155 at [31] (Deputy Judge John 
Randall QC). 
114 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
of being “at Peter’s beck and call”,19 and he turned down other career 
opportunities in order to remain in Somerset with Peter and his parents. 
12 Peter had made a will under which David would have inherited 
the farm, but it was revoked after Peter apparently fell out with one of 
the other beneficiaries and the will was never replaced. When Peter died, 
David brought a proprietary estoppel claim against his estate. He had 
been hoping since the 1980s to inherit the farm and claimed that Peter 
had made “various noises” causing him to believe that he would so 
inherit, but admitted that “nothing very definite” was said.20 The main 
event on which David based his claim consisted of Peter handing David 
a bonus notice relating to two life insurance policies on the former’s life, 
with the remark: “that’s for my death duties”.21 David also sought to rely 
on other indirect remarks made to him by Peter concerning the running 
of the farm, which he claimed reinforced his expectation that he would 
inherit it. Finally, he cited statements that Peter had made to others, 
which gave the impression that David would succeed him. 
13 While David was awarded Peter’s farm at first instance,22 the 
Court of Appeal overturned that decision.23 Although he accepted the 
factual findings that Peter wished David to inherit the farm and that he 
intended to indicate as much through the remarks made, Lloyd LJ 
decided that representations must be “clear and unequivocal” and 
“intended to be relied on” or reasonably taken as so intended.24 In this 
case, the bonus notice event was insufficient since it was “at most, 
a statement of present intention”.25 Lloyd LJ emphasised that Peter knew 
nothing of the specific opportunities that David sacrificed in reliance on 
the alleged representations, which meant that the statements could not 
reasonably be taken as intended to be relied upon. 
14 In spite of the fact that the House of Lords had decided 
Yeoman’s Row after the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Thorner, the 
Appellate Committee unanimously reinstated the decision of the trial 
                                                                       
19 [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch); [2008] WTLR 155 at [82]. 
20 [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch); [2008] WTLR 155 at [86]. 
21 [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch); [2008] WTLR 155 at [94]. 
22 [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch); [2008] WTLR 155 at [86]. See Martin Dixon, “Estoppel 
and Testamentary Freedom” [2007] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 65. 
23 [2008] EWCA Civ 732. See Brian Sloan, “Estoppel and the importance of straight 
talking” [2009] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 154. 
24 [2008] EWCA Civ 732 at [54]. The Court of Appeal in Singapore espoused the 
“clear and unequivocal” requirement in Fook Gee Finance Co Ltd v Lim Cho Chit 
[1991] 2 SLR 121. See Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (Tan Sook 
Yee, Tang Hang Wu & Kelvin F K Low eds) (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2009), at para 7.73 
for analysis of subsequent cases. 
25 [2008] EWCA Civ 732 at [72]. 
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judge in David’s case.26 Lord Walker and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry were 
particularly critical of the “clear and unequivocal” requirement 
espoused by the Court of Appeal, preferring to stipulate that the 
representation must be “clear enough” in the circumstances.27 
Lord Hoffman was unimpressed by the notion that the defendant must 
know of the claimant’s specific acts of reliance when making a 
representation, and considered it sufficient that the representations were 
intended to be “taken seriously”.28 On the other hand, Lord Scott and 
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury were willing to accept the “clear and 
unequivocal” requirement. This did not prevent all the Law Lords from 
agreeing that there was a qualifying representation on the facts of this 
“unusual” case involving “taciturn and undemonstrative men 
committed to a life of hard and unrelenting physical work, by day and 
sometimes by night, largely unrelieved by recreation or female 
company”.29 That said, Lord Scott did prefer to analyse the case in terms 
of the “remedial constructive trust”,30 and to confine proprietary 
estoppel to cases where the representation is unconditional and relates 
to an immediate interest.31 
15 The Committee found it difficult to reconcile Lloyd LJ’s 
apparent acceptance of the factual findings with his conclusion that 
David’s claim should fail. Finally, while the respondents pointed out that 
the extent of the property constituting the “farm” fluctuated over the 
remainder of Peter’s life, the Committee held that there was sufficient 
certainty to render the property identifiable. As Lord Walker pointed 
out, Peter and David were both aware of the potential for the extent of 
the farm to fluctuate over time. As a result, it was found that “their 
common understanding was that Peter’s assurance related to whatever 
the farm consisted of at Peter’s death”.32 The judge’s order was therefore 
restored. 
III. The role of context in justifying the outcomes 
16 The result in Yeoman’s Row is uncontroversial. Although 
Lord Scott said that “debate about subject-to-contract reservations has 
only a peripheral relevance”33 to Yeoman’s Row because an oral contract 
                                                                       
26 [2009] UKHL 18. For a comprehensive analysis of the decision, see John Mee, “The 
Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 367. 
27 [2009] UKHL 18 at [26] and [56]. 
28 [2009] UKHL 18 at [5]. 
29 [2009] UKHL 18 at [59] (Lord Walker). 
30 [2009] UKHL 18 at [14]. 
31 [2009] UKHL 18 at [20]. 
32 [2009] UKHL 18 at [62] (Lord Walker). 
33 [2009] UKHL 18 at [27]. 
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would be unenforceable in any event, in substance it was a 
subject-to-contract case.34 The parties had intentionally avoided making 
a formal commitment. Although Mr Cobbe expected that his expenses 
would be reimbursed should the deal fall through, both parties knew 
that some of the terms of the anticipated enforceable agreement had yet 
to be negotiated. John Mee, for example, opines that the outcomes in 
Thorner and Yeoman’s Row can be reconciled on this basis,35 and 
Lord Neuberger recognised the significance of that aspect of the case.36 
17 The problem comes in attempting to reconcile the general 
remarks of Lords Scott and Walker with the successful claims of 
testamentary promisees, (eventually) including that of David Thorner. 
The aim of this part is to examine the approaches of Lords Scott and 
Walker in Yeoman’s Row and the extent to which these approaches were 
applied in Thorner. More specifically, it is asked whether the context in 
each case was used to justify any discrepancies between them, 
potentially requiring future cases to be classified as “domestic” or 
“commercial”, or whether Thorner simply marks a departure from the 
reasoning in Yeoman’s Row. 
A. Lord Scott’s approach 
18 In the view of Lord Scott, Mr Cobbe was not entitled to a 
remedy that was either estoppel-based or proprietary. He opined that 
proprietary estoppel was a mere sub-species of promissory estoppel. In 
England and Wales at least,37 the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
generally thought to be available only as a shield and in the context of a 
pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties,38 limiting its 
potential as compared to the modern use of its proprietary equivalent. 
Moreover, Lord Scott suggested that the proprietary estoppel doctrine 
operates only to prevent the denial of a point of fact or law standing in 
the way of an existing proprietary claim. 
19 Mr Cobbe claimed neither that the agreement was complete or 
enforceable nor that he had a certain proprietary interest in the flats 
before he brought the claim. His expectation, Lord Scott emphasised, 
was merely that there would be a successful negotiation of a formal 
contract encompassing the core terms already agreed upon. Lord Scott 
                                                                       
34 See Attorney General of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd 
[1987] AC 114 (Privy Council). 
35 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
36 [2009] UKHL 18 at [93]. 
37 Cf Walton Estates v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 426 (Brennan J). 
38 See, eg, Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford 
University Press, 5th Ed, 2009) at para 9.2.5. 
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feared that the conclusions of the courts below had been largely based 
on the sheer unconscionability of Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring’s conduct. 
20 Lord Scott’s analysis, while founded on the absence of the 
anticipated contract, implied that the proprietary claim to which 
estoppel would give effect must exist independently of the doctrine 
itself. This was the interpretation adopted by McFarlane and 
Robertson.39 If Lord Scott’s approach were followed, at least on 
McFarlane and Robertson’s view, claimants in testamentary cases would 
merely be able to estop a representor or her estate from denying the 
existence of an oral promise that is unenforceable in any event. That 
proposition clearly leaves little room for estoppel to create proprietary 
interests and, as a result, McFarlane and Robertson contemplated the 
“death” of proprietary estoppel.40 
21 In the light of Thorner, it could be that Lord Scott did not 
intend to lay down the proposition gleaned by McFarlane and 
Robertson or at least that he did not intend it to have implications for 
testamentary cases. It is true that his primary concern was with the lack 
of certainty in the proprietary interest claimed by Mr Cobbe, and this 
was apparently the sole aspect of Lord Scott’s reasoning that Peter 
Thorner’s personal representatives sought to invoke in contesting 
David’s claim.41 Nevertheless, McFarlane and Robertson’s interpretation 
was a reasonable one, and it was important to dispel it properly in 
Thorner even if the remarks were obiter. Lord Scott did not do so. In 
fact, he did not refer to Yeoman’s Row at all in his speech in Thorner. 
22 Mee argues that Lord Scott underwent an “apparent change of 
mind” in Thorner.42 This would be consistent with his admission that he 
was “in no way disagreeing with [the other Law Lords’] conclusion that 
David can establish his equity … via proprietary estoppel”.43 For his part, 
Lord Walker admitted that he now had “some difficulty” with 
Lord Scott’s characterisation of proprietary estoppel as a sub-species of 
promissory estoppel, further suggesting that a retreat from Yeoman’s 
Row was being made.44 
23 On the other hand, McFarlane and Robertson think that 
Lord Scott retained in Thorner the “narrow view” of estoppel that he set 
                                                                       
39 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “The Death of Proprietary Estoppel” [2008] 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 449. 
40 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “The Death of Proprietary Estoppel” [2008] 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 449. 
41 [2009] UKHL 18 at [31] (Lord Walker). 
42 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 378. 
43 [2009] UKHL 18 at [14]. 
44 [2009] UKHL 18 at [67]. 
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out in Yeoman’s Row.45 This, they argue, explains his preference for 
deciding the case using the “remedial” constructive trust, which he 
considered more suitable for cases involving future interests. Mee 
similarly suggests that Lord Scott’s earlier restriction of estoppel 
effectively forced him to re-classify the earlier estoppel cases as 
applications of the constructive trust.46 
24 Whatever Lord Scott’s present view of his own reasoning in 
Yeoman’s Row, it was left largely to Lord Neuberger to reconcile Thorner 
with the earlier decision, and he relied heavily on context when doing 
so. All of the other Law Lords attached significance to the context of the 
relationship between Peter and David.47 Moreover, while he made no 
specific reference to domestic cases in Yeoman’s Row, in Thorner 
Lord Scott did emphasise that “the significance and implications of the 
conduct of David and Peter respectively in the years leading up to Peter’s 
death have to be assessed in the context of their familial relationship”.48 
Nevertheless, it was Lord Neuberger who expressly used the notion of 
context to explain the differing reasoning in the two cases, thereby 
suggesting that the application of proprietary estoppel principles could 
differ according to whether the context of the case is categorised as 
domestic or commercial. 
25 Admittedly, Lord Neuberger went some way towards justifying 
the discrepancies between the cases using an analysis that does not 
suggest a purely context-based dichotomy. For example, he accepted that 
the conscious decision on the part of Mr Cobbe and 
Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring not to enter a binding contract was a key 
explanation of the reasoning in Yeoman’s Row.49 He also pointed out that 
the uncertainty in relation to the interests involved in the two cases was 
of a different kind. In Thorner it was merely the precise extent of the 
farm at Peter’s death that was unclear, while the very nature and terms 
of the benefit that Mr Cobbe could expect were open to question. 
26 On the other hand, Lord Neuberger made further remarks 
suggesting that a context-based dichotomy may develop in the 
application of estoppel principles. He emphasised that “the relationship 
between Peter and David was familial and personal, and neither of 
them, least of all David, had much commercial experience”.50 As a result 
                                                                       
45 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “Apocalypse Averted: Proprietary Estoppel 
in the House of Lords” (2009) 125 LQR 535 at 538. 
46 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 379–381. 
47 [2009] UKHL 18 at [8] (Lord Hoffman), at [12] (Lord Scott), at [24]–[26] 
(Lord Rodger), at [58]–[60] (Lord Walker). 
48 [2009] UKHL 18 at [12]. 
49 [2009] UKHL 18 at [93]. 
50 [2009] UKHL 18 at [97]. 
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of this, Lord Neuberger opined, they never would have contemplated 
entering a contract and could not reasonably have been expected to do 
so. This focus on the lack of any reasonable expectation that the parties 
would enter a contract, rather than the simple fact that they did not do 
so, suggests that a domestic context is important in itself. This inference 
is reinforced by Lord Neuberger’s bold statement that he saw “nothing” 
in Lord Scott’s reasoning in the earlier case that “assists” Peter’s personal 
representatives and by his view that it would cause “a regrettable and 
substantial emasculation of the beneficial principle of proprietary 
estoppel if it were artificially fettered so as to require the precise extent 
of the property the subject of the alleged estoppel to be strictly defined 
in every case”.51 
27 Admittedly, Lord Neuberger narrowed his analysis of 
Lord Scott’s speech to the issues of certainty as to the extent of the 
proprietary interest. But it is clear that he saw Yeoman’s Row and 
Thorner as different cases requiring distinct analyses due to their 
respective commercial and domestic contexts. Much of the reasoning in 
Yeoman’s Row, on his view, “was directed to the unusual facts of that 
case”.52 Moreover, because of the context he considered it “unlikely in the 
extreme”53 that Lord Scott was intending to disapprove of the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Gillett v Holt,54 a paradigmatic example of a 
successful claim by a testamentary promisee. 
28 In spite of Lord Scott’s reluctance to engage explicitly with the 
implications of his analysis in Yeoman’s Row, Lord Neuberger obviously 
felt it necessary to reconcile it with the decision in Thorner. His attempt 
to do so was not entirely successful because Lord Scott did not himself 
confine his remarks in Yeoman’s Row to the commercial context, either 
at the time he made them or subsequently in Thorner. Nevertheless, 
Lord Neuberger’s speech is itself likely to cause the issue of context to 
come to the fore in future estoppel decisions. The implications of this 
development are considered in Part IV. 
B. Lord Walker’s approach 
29 Lord Walker’s analysis in Yeoman’s Row may also lead to a 
focusing on context in future estoppel decisions in a rather more direct 
sense. There, at a general level, he emphasised that in satisfying the 
elements of estoppel “[i]t is not enough to hope, or even to have a 
confident expectation, that the person who has given assurances will 
                                                                       
51 [2009] UKHL 18 at [98]. 
52 [2009] UKHL 18 at [99]. 
53 [2009] UKHL 18 at [100]. 
54 [2001] Ch 210. 
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eventually do the proper thing”.55 He opined that, in successful estoppel 
claims, “the claimant believed that the assurance on which he or she 
relied was binding and irrevocable”.56 In the case before him, fatally for 
Mr Cobbe, “both parties knew that there was no legally binding 
contract, and that either was therefore free to discontinue the 
negotiations without legal liability”.57 
30 As Mee points out, under Lord Walker’s analysis, the nature of 
the claimant’s belief would effectively become “self-fulfilling”:58 if the 
claimant believed the promise was binding, it would be, but the converse 
is also true. This belief-based analysis is less strict than that of 
Lord Scott. But as McFarlane and Robertson indicated following 
Yeoman’s Row,59 it still raises problems because a testamentary promisee 
is unlikely to believe that the promisor is legally obliged to transfer the 
property to him on the basis of an oral promise. Nevertheless, in 
Thorner, Lord Walker explicitly rejected McFarlane and Robertson’s 
“rather apocalyptic” view of Yeoman’s Row.60 
31 Lord Walker had at least attempted to make allowances for 
claimants in domestic cases when setting out his apparently restrictive 
analysis in Yeoman’s Row. There, he expressly drew a distinction between 
the commercial and the domestic contexts. In the commercial context, 
he emphasised that “the claimant is typically a business person with 
access to legal advice” who expects to gain a contract rather than an 
interest.61 He made several other references to the commercial context. 
These included his opinion that the insufficiency of mere hopes was 
clearest in that context,62 that Mr Cobbe “ran a commercial risk … with 
his eyes open”,63 and that the lack of an express statement that Mr Cobbe 
was relying solely on Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring’s honour was irrelevant in 
the context.64 Lord Walker also identified a general principle that “the 
court should be very slow to introduce uncertainty into commercial 
transactions by over-ready use of equitable concepts such as fiduciary 
obligations and equitable estoppel”.65 
                                                                       
55 [2008] UKHL 55 at [65]. 
56 [2008] UKHL 55 at [66]. 
57 [2008] UKHL 55 at [91]. 
58 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
59 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “The Death of Proprietary Estoppel” [2008] 
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 449. 
60 [2009] UKHL 18 at [31]. 
61 [2008] UKHL 55 at [68]. 
62 [2008] UKHL 55 at [66]. 
63 [2008] UKHL 55 at [81]. 
64 [2008] UKHL 55 at [91]. 
65 [2008] UKHL 55 at [81]. 
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32 By contrast, Lord Walker noted that “[t]he typical domestic 
claimant does not stop to reflect … whether some further legal 
transaction … is necessary to complete the promised title”,66 and that the 
nature of the claimant’s belief is not often tested in such cases, 
suggesting that a more liberal approach would be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, Mee has described Lord Walker’s attempt to explain 
successful estoppel claims in testamentary cases as “rather implausible” 
because of the widespread knowledge of the need for a will.67 It would, 
Mee points out, require a large amount of faith in the legal system to 
believe that an oral promise was in itself binding. 
33 Moreover, Lord Walker arguably undermined his apparent 
generosity towards domestic claimants in Yeoman’s Row. He admitted 
that it would be “unprofitable to trawl through the authorities on 
domestic arrangements” to assess the precise nature of the claimant’s 
expectation where it was not “squarely raised”.68 At the same time, he left 
open the possibility that “some of the domestic cases might have been 
decided differently if the nature of the claimant’s belief had been an 
issue vigorously investigated in cross-examination”.69 In doing so, he 
effectively invited counsel in future domestic cases to undertake such a 
vigorous investigation in cross-examination, and thereby defeat the 
claim. 
34 In any event, Lord Walker did not, when giving judgment in 
Thorner, mention the belief-related requirement that he had set down in 
Yeoman’s Row. As a result, Mee infers that he was retreating from his 
earlier position. This in turn suggests that context cannot fully explain, 
and is not required to explain, the differences between his approach in 
the two cases. On the other hand, Lord Neuberger did invoke 
Lord Walker’s approach in Yeoman’s Row to bolster his conclusion that 
the differences in reasoning between the cases could be explained on the 
basis of context.70 Even if Lord Walker intended to disavow his earlier 
analysis, then, he may not have seen the last of it. 
                                                                       
66 [2008] UKHL 55 at [68]. 
67 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
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C. Summary 
35 The House of Lords has not attempted a full justification for the 
discrepancies between the reasoning in Yeoman’s Row and Thorner. This 
being so, the latter case may well represent a revision of the former, and 
indeed McFarlane and Robertson have expressed the view that in 
Thorner the Appellate Committee was “implicitly rejecting the limits”71 
on estoppel that had been suggested in Yeoman’s Row. In addition, part 
of Lord Neuberger’s reasoning in Thorner justifies the result in Yeoman’s 
Row on the accurate basis that Yeoman’s Row was, in substance, 
a subject-to-contract case. 
36 But following Thorner, and particularly in the light of 
Lord Neuberger’s analysis, context looks set to have a significant impact 
on the reasoning in future estoppel cases. Indeed, in the subsequent case 
of Thompson v Foy,72 Lewison J described Thorner as “[t]he leading 
authority on proprietary estoppel in the domestic context” [emphasis 
added]. On that basis, Part IV of this paper goes on to highlight some of 
the difficulties with the notion of context and the distinction between 
domestic and non-domestic cases. 
IV. Problems with “context” and estoppel 
37 Mee has expressed concern about the use of context as a 
justifying factor in Thorner, while at the same time recognising the 
“obvious temptation” to rely upon it in future cases.73 He argues that 
attaching labels is not good enough because the boundaries of the 
categories are insufficiently clear and the principled reasons for treating 
the two sets of cases differently have not been fully elucidated.74 This 
part examines the use of a context-based approach in the arena of the 
common intention constructive trust and highlights the problems with 
such an approach to property law. It then moves on to outline some 
more general difficulties with the use of proprietary estoppel in the 
domestic context and outside of it. 
                                                                       
71 Ben McFarlane & Andrew Robertson, “Apocalypse Averted: Proprietary Estoppel 
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Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
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A. Definitional difficulties: A comparison with the constructive 
trust 
38 In England and Wales, the common intention constructive 
trust75 has for decades been invoked by unmarried cohabitants seeking 
to claim an interest in property owned at law by their partner, and not 
always with success.76 Following Lloyd’s Bank plc v Rosset,77 the common 
intention of shared ownership necessary to prove a constructive trust 
could be evidenced by express discussions or a financial contribution 
towards the purchase price by a party whose name did not appear on 
the legal title. In Lord Bridge of Harwich’s words, it was “at least 
extremely doubtful whether anything less [would] do”.78 
39 The leading case on the use of the constructive trust by 
cohabitants is now Stack v Dowden.79 It has generated much controversy 
and uncertainty,80 partly since it is unclear whether the House of Lords 
was intending to liberalise or restrict the earlier analysis in Rosset.81 For 
present purposes, the most pertinent aspect of Stack is Baroness Hale of 
Richmond’s assertion that “[i]n law, ‘context is everything’ and the 
domestic context is very different from the commercial world”.82 Among 
the differences highlighted by Baroness Hale was the assumption that 
“the importance to be attached to who paid for what in a domestic 
context may be very different from its importance in other contexts”.83 
As a result she held, inter alia, that “at least in the domestic consumer 
context”84 there is a strong presumption that ownership in equity 
follows the position at law. This presumption apparently applies 
whether legal title is held by one party or by more than one.85 That said, 
its strength has been undermined by the myriad factors that are relevant 
                                                                       
75 For a full discussion, see Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law 
(Oxford University Press, 5th Ed, 2009), ch 7.3. 
76 See, infamously, Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317. 
77 [1991] 1 AC 107. 
78 [1991] 1 AC 107 at 133. 
79 [2007] UKHL 17. 
80 See, eg, Martin Dixon, “The Never-ending Story – Co-ownership after Stack 
v Dowden” [2007] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 456; Matthew Harding, 
“Defending Stack v Dowden” [2009] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 309; 
William Swadling, “The Common Intention Constructive Trust in the House of 
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“Cohabitants and joint ownership: the implications of Stack v Dowden” (2008) 
38 Family Law 924. 
81 Terence Etherton has made the bold argument that Stack heralds the creation of a 
new ground of restitution for unjust enrichment: Etherton, “Constructive Trusts: 
A New Model for Equity and Unjust Enrichment” [2008] CLJ 265. 
82 [2007] UKHL 17 at [69]. 
83 [2007] UKHL 17 at [69]. 
84 [2007] UKHL 17 at [58]. 
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to its displacement on the basis of common intention86 and by the fact 
that it was said to be displaced in Stack itself as well as in subsequent 
cases.87 
40 The majority held that the common intention constructive trust 
was now to be preferred over the resulting trust analysis, which allocates 
shares on the basis of financial contributions to (or possibly financial 
liability in respect of)88 the property, in “domestic” cases. Agreeing with 
Baroness Hale, Lord Hope of Craighead opined that where, conversely, 
the parties have dealt with each other at arm’s length it “makes sense” to 
start with the resulting trust.89 Adding a qualification to these 
complementary principles, Lord Walker acknowledged that the resulting 
trust may still have a role to play where “two people have lived and 
worked together in what has amounted to both an emotional and a 
commercial partnership”.90 This qualification serves only to strengthen 
both the context-based approach and (as Lord Walker admitted)91 the 
confusion that may result from it.92 As Sir Terence Etherton has noted 
extra-judicially, “[t]he express drawing of this distinction between the 
domestic and commercial settings was new, marking a departure from 
the previous jurisprudence …”.93 
41 Lord Neuberger dissented from the reasoning of Baroness Hale 
and other members of the majority. Albeit accepting that “the domestic 
context can give rise to very different factual considerations from the 
commercial context”,94 and that “both the nature and the characteristics 
of the particular relationship must be taken into account”95 when 
applying the relevant principles of property law, he was also conscious 
that “the court should be very careful before altering those principles 
when it comes to a particular type of relationship”.96 
                                                                       
86 [2007] UKHL 17 at [69]. 
87 See, eg, Adekunle v Ritchie [2007] EW Misc 5 (EWCC), but cf Fowler v Barron 
[2008] EWCA Civ 377. 
88 See the remarks of Lord Neuberger in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17  
at [118]–[119] and in Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347 at [27]–[31]. 
89 [2007] UKHL 17 at [3]. 
90 [2007] UKHL 17 at [32]. 
91 [2007] UKHL 17 at [32]. 
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majority in Stack, see Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (Tan Sook 
Yee, Tang Hang Wu & Kelvin F K Low eds) (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2009), at 
paras 7.57–7.58. 
93 Terence Etherton, “Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: The Search for 
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42 In remarks that arguably offer a striking contrast to his 
approach in Thorner, Lord Neuberger was adamant that “the same 
principles should apply to assess the apportionment of the beneficial 
interest as between legal co-owners, whether in a sexual, platonic, 
familial, amicable or commercial relationship”.97 As such, he preferred to 
begin by applying the presumption of resulting trust even as between 
cohabitants. 
43 Nevertheless, the confinement of the strong Stack presumption 
to the domestic sphere was cemented by Lord Neuberger himself when 
he sat in the Court of Appeal in Laskar v Laskar.98 In that case, a house 
registered in the joint names of a mother and daughter was found to 
have been used primarily as an investment, rather than as a home for 
the parties. Although Lord Neuberger recognised that the familial 
connection between the parties meant that they were not truly “in an 
arm’s length commercial relationship”, he noted that they had 
independent lives.99 Most significantly for present purposes, he said that 
it was “by no means clear” to him that the Stack presumption was 
intended by Baroness Hale to be applied in such a case as that before 
him.100 He therefore invoked the resulting trust presumption, although 
he held that the Stack presumption of joint equitable ownership would 
have been displaced on the facts in any event. 
44 Since Lord Neuberger was arguably applying his own dissenting 
judgment in Stack in a Court of Appeal decision, Laskar is perhaps not 
the strongest authority. Seen from another perspective, it is rather ironic 
that in spite of his misgivings in Stack, Lord Neuberger has had to adopt 
a contextual approach in deciding both constructive trust and estoppel 
cases because of the approaches of other members of the House of 
Lords. Regardless of the judicial politics involved in the application of 
the Stack presumption, Laskar does attach significance to the 
categorisation of a case. As a result, we may have to distinguish between 
“domestic” and “non-domestic” cases in relation to both proprietary 
estoppel and the application (or the effective non-application) of the 
common intention constructive trust. 
45 The fundamental nature of the relationship between 
proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust is a matter of some 
debate.101 This debate is likely to continue given Lord Scott’s purported 
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application of the remedial constructive trust in Thorner, in spite of 
previous pronouncements by senior judges that the remedial version is 
not a part of English Law.102 Indeed, one High Court judge recently 
concluded that, following Lord Scott’s analysis in Thorner, “it is wrong 
in principle to confuse the two distinct equitable remedies of 
proprietary estoppel and constructive trust, and to regard the former as 
a species of the latter”.103 
46 Whatever the precise relationship between the two doctrines, 
however, both are facing similar problems relating to their application in 
“domestic” cases. As Piska describes the categorisation process in the 
resulting/constructive trust sphere, the court must examine the 
surrounding circumstances of the case and “shoe-horn the parties’ 
relationship into the domestic or commercial dichotomy that 
determines the appropriate legal principles”,104 and a similar approach 
could now be necessary in estoppel cases. 
47 The difficulty of this process has been recognised by 
Lord Neuberger in a lecture to the Chancery Bar Association.105 It is 
illustrated by his endorsement of H H J Behrens’ conclusion in the 
county court case of Adekunle v Ritchie.106 There, the judge decided that 
the Stack presumption did apply as between a parent and son or 
daughter where, unlike Laskar, the property was occupied by a parent as 
a home rather than being held as an investment. Moreover, in relation to 
the “primary purpose” test adopted in Laskar,107 Sir Terence Etherton has 
argued that “[e]valuation of the comparative importance of anticipated 
and actual financial, social, familial and emotional expectations and 
rewards from mixed use of property or temporary use of property may 
be difficult”.108 
48 Piska has pointed out that the distinction upheld in Laskar is 
likely to become a source of confusion because the same factors are 
being evaluated in asking whether the case is a domestic one and 
whether there is a common intention sufficient to found the existence of 
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a constructive trust. If the domestic/non-domestic dichotomy is 
maintained for the purposes of estoppel, similar confusion could result 
from the categorisation of the case in combination with the question 
whether there is a relevant representation. 
49 The problem is compounded by the fact that the application of 
proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust may not fall on the same 
side of the line when adjudicating upon similar factual scenarios. In 
Laskar, the commercial investment activity for which the mother and 
daughter used the property was apparently more important than their 
domestic relationship,109 even if they did lead independent lives. This 
may be at odds with the approach in Thorner, where Lord Neuberger 
considered the informality of Peter and David’s relationship and David’s 
lack of business experience sufficient to render the case a domestic one. 
Indeed, Thorner is not a clear domestic case if the nature of the work 
performed is taken into account, although it would apparently be placed 
in the same category as more obviously domestic cases involving 
informal carers.110 
50 Even where estoppel and the constructive trust do place 
factually similar cases in the same category, the effect of the 
categorisation may be different. Strangely, a domestic context seemingly 
makes it more difficult to show differing legal and equitable interests in 
the constructive trust sphere, while arguably making it easier to do so in 
the realm of proprietary estoppel. It must be admitted that the precise 
effect of the distinction between domestic and commercial in the case of 
estoppel is itself uncertain as yet. Stack, on the other hand, imposes a 
mere presumption according to whether the case at hand is domestic or 
commercial. While he personally doubts the continued relevance of 
detrimental reliance in the domestic setting, Sir Terence Etherton notes 
the lack of judicial suggestion that “within the envelope of those 
presumptions, the [common intention constructive trust] operates 
differently in the domestic and commercial fields”.111 The extent of the 
impact of categorisation in estoppel cases, given the contrasting 
approaches in Thorner and Yeoman’s Row, remains to be seen. 
51 If the doctrines of proprietary estoppel and the constructive 
trust are indeed distinct, it may be unsurprising that context can have 
contrasting effects on their operation. In Lord Walker’s opinion, as 
expressed in Stack, proprietary estoppel is concerned with “asserting an 
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equitable claim against the conscience of the ‘true’ owner”, while a 
common intention constructive trust “is identifying the true beneficial 
owner or owners, and the size of their beneficial interests”.112 In relation 
to the constructive trust, Lord Neuberger was addressing his views on 
context in Stack to “the issue of the ownership of the beneficial interest 
in property held in the names of two people, who have contributed to its 
acquisition, retention or value”.113 Adjudicating on an estoppel case, as 
we have seen, can involve a decision on whether the context means that 
the claimant was expecting an interest at all, as distinct from a mere 
contract. Even so, the variable consequences of a contextual approach 
remain complex and arguably undesirable, however laudable such an 
approach may be in principle. 
52 In a sense the “context” could simply refer to the circumstances 
of the case. It is inevitable that contextual factors will influence the 
result of any case, including in areas of law where the applicable 
principles are apparently much less open to interpretation than those 
governing proprietary estoppel (or the constructive trust). The judiciary 
are frequently sensitive to contextual factors when developing the 
common law, a prime example of this sensitivity being a greater 
reluctance to assume that parties in certain intimate relationships intend 
to create legal relations when they deal with each other.114 Indeed, even 
when purporting to reject the modification of the principles of property 
law for particular contexts in Stack, Lord Neuberger accepted that “the 
nature of the relationship [between the parties] will bear on the 
inferences to be drawn from their discussions and actions”.115 
53 But if it could allocate a set of facts within a dichotomy that 
effectively determines where the decision-making process begins – as it 
does in constructive trust cases and may do in estoppel cases – the 
attachment of importance to context is much more vulnerable to 
objection. Continuing the analysis, the next section of this paper briefly 
considers more general objections to the use of estoppel to enforce 
testamentary promises, as a prelude to the analysis of a statutory 
alternative that would minimise the need for a contextual approach to 
estoppel. 
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B. The legitimacy of proprietary estoppel 
54 Aside from the uncertainty in their application, the very 
legitimacy of the principles of proprietary estoppel is open to question. 
For example Dixon, anxious that estoppel should not become “the 
penicillin of equity”,116 argues that, for reasons that have never been fully 
analysed,117 it has been allowed to circumvent formality requirements 
relating to wills. 
55 Similarly, Mee still urges caution in the use of estoppel even if a 
distinction could in practice be made between domestic and 
commercial estoppel cases. He emphasises that oblique representations 
such as Peter Thorner’s are inherently more difficult to interpret than 
clear ones, and points out that even domestic claimants are usually able 
to seek clarification as to their entitlement. Adopting Goymour’s 
terminology,118 Mee accepts that Mr Cobbe was a “commercial 
risk-taker”.119 But he also describes David Thorner as a “domestic 
risk-taker”.120 He suggests that as much as one might feel sympathy for a 
“trusting claimant in the family context”,121 many domestic claimants are 
in substantially the same position as commercial ones. 
56 Mee’s argument may reflect unrealistic expectations about the 
options open to a hard-working claimant in a domestic scenario. At the 
very least, it is at odds with the clear judicial sympathy exhibited 
towards such claimants. In Jennings v Rice, for example, Robert 
Walker LJ (as he then was) was particularly conscious of the 
“ever-increasing burden of care for an elderly person, and … having to 
be subservient to his or her moods and wishes”.122 Regardless of the 
normative propriety or otherwise of enforcing oral testamentary 
promises for those who have incurred detriment without fully verifying 
                                                                       
116 Martin Dixon, “Proprietary estoppel: a Return to Principle?” [2009] 
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 260 at 261. 
117 Martin Dixon, “Proprietary estoppel: a Return to Principle?” [2009] 
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 260 at 261. See also Martin Dixon, 
“Proprietary Estoppel and Formalities in Land Law and the Land Registration 
Act 2002: A Theory of Unconscionability” in Modern Studies in Property Law: 
Volume 2 (Elizabeth Cooke ed) (Hart, 2003). 
118 Amy Goymour, “Cobbling Together Claims where a Contract Fails to Materialise” 
[2009] CLJ 37. For a discussion of officiousness and risk-taking in the context of 
unjust enrichment, see eg Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2006) at pp 39–40. 
119 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
120 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
121 John Mee, “The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major” [2009] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 367 at 374. 
122 [2002] EWCA Civ 159 at [51]. 
130 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2010) 22 SAcLJ 
 
their entitlement, it is necessary to question whether estoppel provides 
an appropriate means of doing so. This is particularly true if Thorner 
requires a context-based dichotomy to be operated, risking uncertainty 
and prejudicing principled judicial decision-making. A remedy 
specifically tailored to “domestic” scenarios may be more desirable. 
57 Moreover, a number of other features of the estoppel doctrine 
are currently sources of debate. These include the significance of 
unconscionability as an independent element of the doctrine,123 the 
relationship between estoppel and the constructive trust (as we have 
seen), the associated question whether estoppel justifiably falls outside 
the formality requirements imposed on contracts for the sale of land,124 
the consequences of conditionality and the realisation of the property 
forming the subject-matter of the representation,125 the principles 
governing the remedy in estoppel cases,126 and the effect of such issues in 
domestic cases. 
58 For all of these reasons, the next part of this article evaluates the 
merits of an alternative statutory mechanism for the enforcement of 
testamentary promises. A statutory footing could attach a degree of 
legitimacy to such enforcement that estoppel may not currently possess, 
and enable an explicit contextual approach to be adopted without 
prejudicing the general applicability of judicially-developed principles 
of property law. 
V. A statutory solution? 
59 There has been wide recognition of the need for a statutory 
alternative to the common intention constructive trust as a means of 
redistributing the property of unmarried cohabitants in England and 
Wales,127 and much ink has been spilled on the issue.128 It is often implied 
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that the lack of such a scheme is linked to many difficult aspects of 
Baroness Hale’s judgment in Stack.129 Rather than seeking to add to that 
saturated debate, this part briefly evaluates the merits of an analogous 
statutory scheme for the enforcement of oral testamentary promises, as 
an alternative to the use of proprietary estoppel. 
60 It seems that only one such statutory mechanism presently 
exists in the common law world,130 namely New Zealand’s Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949. The Act allows for the enforcement 
of “express or implied” promises of testamentary provision made to 
reward the claimant for the “rendering of services to or the performance 
of work for the deceased in his lifetime”, in situations where “the 
deceased has failed to make [the promised] testamentary provision or 
otherwise remunerate the claimant”.131 
61 The term “promise” is expressed to include “any statement or 
representation of fact or intention” by the Act.132 It need not relate to 
“specified real or personal property”,133 and is sufficiently wide to include 
statements that the testator will see the claimant “right”.134 Unlike in the 
realm of estoppel, the promise must be for provision in a will.135 This is a 
potentially significant limitation, but in New Zealand the testamentary 
nature of the promise can be inferred from the circumstances.136 The 
promise is construed from the point of view of the claimant’s reasonable 
beliefs regarding the testator’s intentions.137 
62 The courts have been generous in setting out the nature of the 
“services” or “work”138 considered relevant to a claim under the Act, and 
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they have done so with regard to the remedial purpose of the Act.139 
Moreover, while there must be some “nexus or linkage” between the 
promise and the services or work,140 the Act applies “[w]hether the 
services were rendered or the work was performed before or after the 
making of the promise”.141 
63 The remedy to be granted is one for “such amount as may be 
reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances of the case”,142 
although where the promise related to a particular piece of real or 
personal property the court has a discretion to award that property to 
the claimant.143 The Act has been interpreted in such a way that the value 
of the promise represents the ceiling of a “reasonable” award.144 It could 
be argued that such a remedy is generally less powerful than English 
estoppel’s “inchoate equity”,145 which is capable of binding third parties 
from the moment it arises.146 But the uncertainty surrounding the 
“minimum equity”147 approach148 may preclude such a general 
conclusion. Moreover, given the plurality of potential claims on the 
deceased’s estate, a non-proprietary remedy is arguably more 
appropriate for a testamentary promisee.149 
64 Much more could be said on the details of the Act and the case 
law generated by it,150 but for present purposes it is sufficient to evaluate 
the merits of a statutory approach as an alternative to estoppel. 
Patterson claims that the impetus for statutory intervention in 
New Zealand was provided by judicial comments on the inadequacy of 
the common law151 (including equitable estoppel). As we have seen, the 
courts have adopted a benevolent and purposive approach to the 
interpretation of the Act’s requirements. One judge expressed the view 
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that “[t]he remedial nature of the Act must be central in the Court’s 
deliberations as that is the object of the statute”.152 
65 It could be said that estoppel is doing an admirable job in 
providing a remedy for disadvantaged testamentary promisees in 
England and Wales. Indeed, in the light of Thorner, few such promisees 
are likely to go away empty-handed. Even so, a statutory mechanism 
could remove many of the difficulties with estoppel highlighted in this 
article. These include both the concerns over the legitimacy of using 
proprietary estoppel to circumvent the applicable principles of 
succession law and the uncertainty created by the context-specific 
application of property law doctrines. 
66 In New Zealand, few claims are brought by testamentary 
promisees in estoppel, contract, or unjust enrichment in situations 
where the promisor has died.153 Such other claims may be available to 
the promisee, but he is required to elect which remedy should be 
pursued.154 If most of these scenarios could similarly be removed from 
the realm of estoppel in other common law jurisdictions, this would 
allow the development of estoppel to cater (or, perhaps more accurately, 
not to cater) for those categories of case that remain exclusively within 
its remit. 
67 Writing about promises made to informal carers, Nield opines 
that a statutory method of enforcing a testamentary promise “tends to 
cut through the moral tensions presented by balancing the exploitation 
of carers against … certainty … and freedom of testamentary 
disposition”.155 Similarly, Oosterhoff argues that there is “much to be said 
for codifying the anfractuous law of testamentary promises and 
[bringing] all of it together in a modern, clear, statement of 
entitlement”.156 In his view, this would simplify the administration of 
estates and improve understanding of the law among the general public. 
These views are arguably applicable to England and Wales (and other 
common law jurisdictions) in the light of Thorner and Yeoman’s Row. 
68 Of course, “context” plays an important part of the 
decision-making process even in New Zealand cases decided under the 
1949 Act. For example, in Re Welch, the Privy Council was of the view 
that “some straining of the scope of the Act is required to bring within 
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the concept of services the natural incidents and consequences of life 
within a close family group”.157 But flexibility of that sort is likely to be 
less problematic where the judiciary are exercising a power to provide a 
specific and discretionary statutory remedy. 
69 The New Zealand Act has nevertheless come in for some 
criticism. Peart argues that the wide discretion possessed by the court in 
fashioning the remedy means that the Act is “widely regarded as a 
restriction on testamentary freedom”.158 Nevertheless, she acknowledges 
that the Act could be analysed as “a means of enforcing a debt rather 
than a limit on testamentary freedom” because of its quasi-contractual 
nature,159 and it would seem strange if the Act were considered to be 
more of an infringement of testamentary freedom because the court is 
given a discretion to award less than the value of what was promised. 
70 Whatever one’s response to the question whether a remedy 
should be provided for oral testamentary promisees, it is clear following 
Thorner that the senior judiciary in England and Wales are determined 
to provide such a remedy where the promise is “clear enough” in the 
circumstances and there is judged to be sufficient detrimental reliance to 
render the promisor’s conduct unconscionable. Against that 
background, a statutory remedy is arguably preferable to the difficulties 
highlighted earlier with a contextual approach to estoppel. This is true 
even if such a remedy would not cover all deserving cases, and in spite 
of the claim that estoppel may justifiably play a role as an independent 
source of rights even in a commercial context.160 
VI. Conclusion: The future of proprietary estoppel 
71 Thorner undoubtedly represents the last word on proprietary 
estoppel from the House of Lords per se, since the institution has now 
morphed into the Supreme Court. But it may not be the last time that 
the doctrine is considered by the highest court in England and Wales. It 
is hard to disagree with Mee’s assertion that Thorner and Yeoman’s Row 
“do not justify confidence that the House of Lords has yet come fully to 
grips with the considerable complexities of proprietary estoppel”.161 The 
future of context-specific property law, whose expansion is likely to be 
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provoked by Thorner, will be an interesting one. Meanwhile, a statutory 
alternative to estoppel for the enforcement of testamentary promises is 
worthy of consideration. 
 
